We report results of a survey among active forecasters of the German business cycle. Using data for 82 respondents from 37 different institutions, we investigate what models and theories forecasters subscribe to and find that they are pronounced conservative in the sense that they overwhelmingly rely on methods and theories that have been well-established for a long time, while more recent approaches are relatively unimportant for the practice of business cycle forecasting. DSGE models are mostly used in public institutions. In line with findings in the literature there are tendencies of "leaning towards consensus" (especially for public institutions) and "sticky adjustment of forecasts" with regard to new information. A stable relationship between preferred theories and methods and forecast accuracy cannot be established.
Introduction
Ever since the invention of economic forecasting as a business it attracts public attention (Friedman 2014; FAZ 2016; Nienhaus 2009 ). Knowledge, however, on the formation of business cycle forecasts is rare. This is astonishing given the high importance of expectations in modern macroeconomic theory.
Policy institutions such as ECB or the Federal Reserve System in the U.S. but also private firms like "Consensus Economics" regularly poll forecasters on how economically educated actors form their expectations of future macroeconomic development. Arguably, professional forecasters seem to play a prominent role in shaping society's expectations on economic issues. Rational inattention models (Sims 1998 (Sims , 2003 Woodford 2002; Ma´Ckowiak/Wiederholt 2009) as well as models of sticky information (Mankiw 2006 ) received a lot of interest in the last couple of years in macroeconomics and imply a role for professional forecasters. Carroll (2003) implicitly assumes a sticky information environment and delivers a model based on "epidemiology" ( = informedness as a passive desease infection) to model the trickle-down of information flows from highly informed experts to the general public. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) argue that the dynamics of expectation formation and the updating of expectations as observed in survey data are in line with "rational inattention" models. Furthermore, the turmoil of the recent financial crisis and the deep recession in its aftermath brought economists, economic models and forecasters under harsh criticism.
Our paper contributes to understanding the work of the "fortune tellers" (Friedman 2014 ). Our goal is to answer some questions about the motivation and organization of the forecasting process and to identify theories/models behind macroeconomic forecasting in Germany. For this purpose, we conducted an online-survey among professional forecasters which are all producing forecasts for the German economy -either in public or private institutions in Germany or in supranational or international organizations outside Germany.
1
The paper relates to an existing strand of literature using surveys among professional forecasters. Dua (1990a, 1990b) analyse how divergent theories and models are across different forecasting institutions and ask, whether forecasting accuracy depends on these differences. To make a long story short, the authors of these previous studies do not find a strong impact of theoretical positions and forecasting techniques on the accuracy of the forecasts. 2 In a similar vein, Ashiya (2006) cannot find a respective connection based on Japanese data. The European Central Bank (2009, 2014) has conducted special surveys among participants of the regular "Survey of Professional Forecasters". The results confirm a great importance of judgemental forecasting as opposed to model based forecasting (Fildes and Stekler 2002; Lawrence et al. 2006 ). Furthermore, they find a very low "relative weight" of use of modern macroeconomic (i. e. New Keynesian DSGE) models, which contrasts to the high academic importance of these models (Wieland/Wolters 2013; Del Negro/Schorfheide 2013) . In a similar vein, Stark (2013) presents results based on a special survey among the U.S. "Survey of Professional Forecasters". According to his results, forecasters use a combination of methods with a high degree of judgemental methods. Again, models, that are arguably a little old-fashioned but robust -like traditional IS/LM models or strongly related AS-AD frameworks -, may be still of great relative importance as a guideline for forecaster's judgemental forecasts (Krugman 2000) . The paper is also related to another strand of literature which employs observed forecasts and respective errors to test hypotheses about forecast properties and the behaviour of forecasters, namely unbiasedness and efficiency of macroeconomic forecasts (Fildes/Stekler 2002) , information rigidities and "leaning towards consensus" (Dovern et al. 2014; Coibion/ Gorodnichenko 2015) behaviour. Several paper such as Wang and Lee (2014) or Döpke et al. (2018) started to investigate some of those topics for the period after the Great Recession. However, to the best of our knowledge, those issues have not been investigated using a questionnaire and asking forecasters directly.
Our paper adds to this literature by investigating the following issues by surveying the forecasters: -Which models and theories do forecasters subscribe to? -Do forecaster rely on different theories when forecasting as compared to the theories they use for policy advice? -Has the behaviour of forecasters changed since the Great Recession? -Do forecasters use different models now than a decade ago? -Is there a relationship between theories/models and forecast accuracy?
-What about "leaning towards consensus", herding, inefficient information processing or changes in risk-aversion/attitudes/loss function?
Briefly summarizing our results, we are not able to establish a direct link between forecast accuracy and theories and methods. In line with former studies we find that practitioners tend to be hesitant in adopting methods that are currently championed by the academic discussion. We find some albeit weak and statistically insignificant evidence, that the younger generation forecasters claims to be more open to non-linear forecasting tools and machine-learning-based methods. We find that forecasters are conservative in the sense, that they overwhelmingly rely on methods and theories that have been well-established for a long time, while more recent approaches are relatively unimportant for the practice of business cycle forecasting. The academic evaluation of publicly funded research institutes (Leibniz institutes) 3 seems to have changed this to some extent as forecasters in public institutions claim to use DSGE models significantly more often as their counterparts in private ones. This could indicate a social-desirability phenomenon in the selection of methods as academic excellence over the last decade became a fundamental criterion for the funding of public economic research institutes in Germany (Bertrand/Mullainathan 2001; Ketzler/Zimmermann 2013) . However, for all forecasters there is selfreported evidence for a "leaning-towards-consensus" attitude (especially among forecasters in public institutions) and a tendency of inefficient information processing. Interestingly, individual statements given in the open answer categories indicate, that "experience", "personal forecasting experience", "experience based knowledge", or "historical experience" were all given as important elements of the forecasting efforts. This implies that the topic "how experience shapes expectations" is somewhat present among forecasters and a relation to "personal/historical experience" is established by some individuals. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data set. In Section 3 we present the empirical analysis with respect to the questions raised above. Section 4 discusses the result and summarizes. Further details about the questionnaire can be found in the appendix sections.
Data

The statistical population
To define the statistical population of our investigation we have to clarify what we understand as the kind of "forecaster" we are interested in. We identified the following criteria to define the group we are aiming at: -The institution is based in Germany and provides forecasts for the German economy. This criterion excludes, e. g., the European Central Bank, which does not provide forecasts specifically for the German economy, but rather for the entire Euro-zone only. -The forecasts are of quantitative nature, i. e. at least a prediction for real GDP growth is provided. For example, this criterion rules out associations which comment on the current economic situation, but don't provide numbers. Also, some commentators on economic policy with a more heterodox theoretical background, such as the Arbeitsgruppe alternative Wirtschaftspolitik (Memorandum-Gruppe) (2016) do not match this criterion. -The forecast is a macroeconomic forecast, i. e. we exclude institutions that provide forecasts for individual sectors, branches, or regions only from our sample. For example, neither BITKOM -Germany's digital association (2016), which provides forecasts for the IT branch only, nor the Niedersächsisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (NIW) (2016), which provides forecasts for only one German state, are part of our sample. -The institution forecasts on a regular basis. This criterion excludes some individuals, which have been credited for foreseeing the financial crisis like, e. g. Otte (2011) . -We refer to short-run, i. e. mostly to one-year-ahead or at best two-yearahead forecasts. In other words, the forecasts have to be made at least at annual frequency and refer to the economic situation in the coming period. -We refer to forecasts that are -at least in part -offered as a public good.
Some institutions provide a detailed explanation of the forecasts only for their customers, but are counted in public rankings with their "headline" numbers of, say, real GDP growth. Our net-based search strategy, however, will miss firms that provide their forecasts exclusively for their customers, although we are not aware of such a firm. Generally, since media coverage is arguably very important as a marketing tool, we are quite confident that we have not missed an important part of the forecasting industry. -In contrast to previous studies, our basic statistical unit are not the forecasting institutions, but the individual forecasters. This renders it possible to Theories, Techniques collect information over forecasting processes, the motivations of forecasters and the like. -We refer to currently active forecasters. 4 Relying on publicly available information we have identified 266 persons that might work on forecasts for the German economy on a regular basis. We have taken into account institutions that have been listed in the ranking of Fricke (2016) and the regular reports of Consensus ForecastTM (2016). Some information we have collected from several web-pages on the internet appeared to be misleading: in some cases the mails have been undeliverable, in some cases automatic response mails indicated a long term absence of the person and some colleagues informed us that they are not in charge of forecasting the German economy. A complete list of all institutions to which we have sent at least one invitation email is provided in Appendix A. Table 1 gives the quantitative overview over the responses. The response rates were 34 %, for the contacted persons, and 67 % for the listed institutions. This is in line with usual response rates for online surveys as reported in the respective literature (Nulty 2008; Morton et al. 2012) . To protect the anonymity of the respondents, we keep the groups rather broad and distinguish four of them:
-Publicly financed institutes (item i in appendix A), -Privately financed institutes (items ii and iii in appendix A), -Government, central banks, international institutions, and institutions of policy advice (items iv and v in appendix A), -Private firms and associations (items vi and vii in appendix A). 
The questionnaire
The final version of the questionnaire consisted of nine parts with a total of 24 questions. With this, we designed a comprehensive and exploratory questionnaire that makes use of different methodologies for data collection. Consequently, the questions differ in complexity and estimated response time.
Depending on which seemed most appropriate for a particular question, we included Likert scales, list boxes and freetext questions. More specifically, we asked participants about models used for forecasting and theories they indicated to apply which may both influence the forecast and the forecasting process, and asked them quantitative assessment questions aiming at their macroeconomic beliefs. Furthermore, we addressed questions related to forecasting teams, forecast errors, and potential adjustments that may have been made after the Great Recession. We were also interested in potential herding behaviour and risk management of forecasting teams, which we will explain later on. Additionally, we asked about the individual forecaster's motivation for choosing economic forecasting as their profession. In the last section, we collected demographic data. Finally, participants were given the opportunity to comment on the questionnaires and leave their suggestions.
For the sake of brevity, wo do not present all question in detail here. Rather, they can be found in English 5 in the working paper version of this paper (Döpke et al., 2017 3 Empirical results Table 2 gives some information about the survey respondents. While the median age is not astonishing, the median length of work experience gives some food for thought. The cyclical peak before the Great Recession is usually dated in 2007. This implies that roughly half of the forecasters today have no on-the-job experience with a (pronounced) recession. Arguably, self-experienced episodes of economic turmoil or inflation may have lasting imprinting effects on expectation formation and risk-taking behavior (Malmendier/Nagel 2011 . This leads to the question whether some institutionally embedded experience exists, for example, in the form of experienced colleagues that might share their memories from the last cyclical downturn (and upswing). The forecasting industry seems to be "a man's world": The share of female forecasters is low in comparison to the share of women holding a degree in Economics Germany. This is line with findings of Fondsfrauen (2015) , a lobby group promoting women's careers in the finance industry, which counts just 4 out of 55 institutions having a female chief economist.
Demographic statistics
Forecasters usually hold academic degrees, a majority of them received doctoral or Ph.D degrees. Practically all forecasters named economics as their main field of studies. Only one person has studied mathematics and two others choose the option "other" fields, but both have a similar field or an additional field of studies. For the moment, there doesn't seem to be much Figure 1: Methods used in the forecasting process. Source: own survey and calculation.
6 As Sinclair (2015) put it in front of a workshop of (mostly) economists, who work in the field of forecasting: "Data scientists are coming for our jobs!" 7 For a description of these methods see, e. g., DöHrn (2014).
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championed by the academic literature (e. g. machine learning tools, non-linear models and DSGE models) are not widely used. Again, respondents, who have chosen the option "other methods" have been asked what methods they have in mind, the answers are listed in Appendix B.
All in all, a marked difference between the recommendations of the academic literature and the practice of forecasting shines up. There is, however, evidence, that somewhat younger (below the median age) forecasters as well as forecasters employed at publicly funded research institutes 8 tend to use nonlinear and DSGE-based forecasting tools more often. The results reported in Method and age
Method and nature of institution
8 The respective appendix section provides a list of institutions. We have counted the institutions listed under "private firms", "privately financed research institutes" and "associations" as private institutions, all others as public institutions. Table 3 show that DSGE models are -to a very small extent -more popular among younger forecasters and are used more frequently in public institutions.
9
The latter also holds for non-linear (e.g, Probit or Logit type of) models. The two results, however, are not completely independent from each other since younger forecasters work more often at public institutions, whereas forecasters at private institutions are on average somewhat older. We also asked for the importance of particular theoretical positions in the forecasting process. The results of this task are given in Figure 2 . First, the claim that no theory is particularly important for forecasting is popular among the respondents. In part, this might reflect a dominance of data-driven approaches in practical forecasting. Turning to the individual theoretical approaches, the results point to high importance of Keynesian ones, either under the more traditional header "Neoclassical Synthesis" or the modern designation "Neo-Keynesianism". We also had two free text answers stating additional theoretical positions that are relevant to at least one forecaster. The items can be found in the appendix section 4.
We asked participants about importance of certain theories for the forecasting process, as well as about the importance of certain theories for the forecaster personally. The results differ only a little, and are reported in Figure 3 . 
Notes: a χ 2 -test for independence of rows and columns. b Fisher exact test for independence of rows and columns. p-values in brackets.
Source: own survey and calculation. NA due to insufficient number of observations. 9 In our sample, the median age of forecasters in private institutions is 50 years, while the respective number for public institution is 38 years.
Theories, Techniques
The response to this question is in line with recent claims (see, e. g., Bofinger 2016) , that Ordo-liberalism and related positions are still of relatively great importance for German economists. It seems reasonable to assume that normative comments on macroeconomic policy are merely driven by the personal beliefs of forecasters. Insofar some German forecasters may find themselves in a somewhat uncomfortable situation, since the theories, which they rely their forecasts on, are different from the theories founding their normative positions. In Table 4 we tested for differences between "importance for forecasting" and "personal importance" for different groups. Generally, Keynesian and NeoKeynesian approaches seem to be important both for forecasting and personally, but also supply-side economics. Differences between the two points of view are rare. Only in case of "Evolutionary economics" we find a significant difference at usual levels. "Monetarism" and "Real business cycle theory" are the only cases where the importance for forecasting is on average higher than the personal importance. 
Theories, Techniques
Last but not least, in Table 5 we report results for testing the hypotheses that an individual preference for a specific school of thought does neither depend on age nor on the nature of the institution. For most of the answer categories there are no significant differences. Exceptions are the schools of "Monetarism", "Austrian economics" and "Political business cycles" for which the null hypothesis of no differences with regard to age is rejected and "Post-Keynesian economics" for which the rejection of the nodifference hypothesis is possible with respect to differences in institutional affiliations.
The main reasons for forecasting errors in the eyes of the forecasters
The reasons for forecasting errors have been subject to much academic efforts and public controversies (for an overview of some possible explanation see Fritsche/Tarassow 2017; Stekler 2007 , and the literature cited therein). Thus, we have asked forecasters about the reasons for this. The results, depicted in Figure 4 are striking: almost exclusively, forecasters see the most important sources of forecasting errors outside the forecasting process. Data revisions and wrong assumptions are frequently named as the things that have gone wrong. The first factor that can be associated with forecaster's wrongdoing 
Real business-cycle theory
Notes: The Likert-scale is recoded from 5 ("Extremely important") to 1 ("Unimportant"). a t-value for a parametric test for equal means. b Rank sum for a non-parametric test for equal medians. p-values in brackets.
Source: own survey and calculation. Keynesian theory (Neo-classical synth.)
Null Hypothesis: Does not depend on nature of institution
Theoretical position Private Public t-test Mann Whitneytest
Keynesian theory (Neo-classical synth.)
Source: own survey and calculation.
Theories, Techniques ranks only at the fourth place among the listed reasons for errors (the possibility of missed structural breaks). Only a minority of the participants points to qualitative or quantitative problems with the underlying forecasting models. Some hypotheses, albeit quite popular in the academic literature -the idea of self-destroying forecasts and intentional forecast errors -find practically no support among the surveyed practitioners. Also, nearly no forecaster is prepared to admit that forecasting errors occur to do the financier or customer a favour. This hypothesis is by far the most popular explanation of forecasts errors in the media (Döpke, 2000 , collects some quotes in this direction) and has some support in the political economy of policy advice (see, e. g. Ngo et al. 2018 ). The answers given in the open answer category -see appendix section 4 -however, give some hints about the narratives which forecasters use to explain their forecast errors: "future is (simply) unknown" is stated at least twice and "high complexity" is also given as answer. Others point to (external) economic shocks that occurred but were excluded by assumption from the forecast or argue that wrong assumptions were made about variables not in the forecasting
In making of the forecast, there have been considerations of the interest of the customer or financier of the forecast
The forecast error has been 'intentional' (e.g., a recession has been forecasted to provoke political measure to avoid it)
The forecast has been self−destroying: since it was known publicly, it changed the behavior of firms, households, or policy makers
The explicit or implicit forecasting models appeared to be wrong: some important relationships have been missed qualitatively set (e. g. world trade volumes, oil prices, exchange rates). One forecaster mentioned "technical" mistakes in the way corrections were made due to seasonal or working day effects. 
Quantitative assessments
To obtain insights about the underlying beliefs of forecasters, we have also asked for some rough quantitative assessments that may help to gauge the model the forecaster beliefs in. All assessments refer to a hypothetical macroeconomic situation. The first scenario is devoted to learn about the forecasters view of fiscal policy. This question has (re-)gained a lot of interest, since Blanchard and Leigh (2013) have argued in a seminal paper that botched macroeconomic predictions from the IMF may be attributed to an underestimation of the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier. For the "fiscal thought experiment", the questionnaire lists several assumptions as documented in the working paper version of this paper.
11 Figure 5a shows the magnitude of the multiplier as reported by the respondents in the short-run and in the long-run. The distribution of the self-reported views on the multiplier points to the possibility that German forecasters see positive short-run net effects of fiscal stimuli: all reported multiplier values exceed zero and the distribution centers around 1. In the long-run, however, the distribution is more bi-modal: the vast majority of the forecasters that have responded do not assume that fiscal policy has no stimulating effect on the economy in the long run and report a multiplier of by about zero, while a minority sees also long-run multipliers different from zero. It is not clear, though, whether these views are actually used when it comes to forecasting.
10 All statements in the respective open answer are presented in appendix section 4. 11 Basically a negative output gap, somewhat "normal" interest rates, no "zero lower bound" situation and a "normal" Taylor rule for monetary policy reaction. As a referee correctly pointed out, this list of assumptions might still be incomplete. For example, the multiplier might differ with respect to the demand component (e. g., government investment or consumption) for which the increase of spending is assumed. Moreover, real GDP as response variable is implicitly assumed in the question. Still, we believe that this question might give some useful insights: First, any respondent that has deemed the assumptions to be inadequate to make up his/her mind, had the possibility to skip the question and comment on the problem in free text questions, which only two out of 82 respondents actually did. Second, some theoretical positions would imply long-run (or even short-run) multipliers that are effectively zero, regardless of the underlying assumption. Therefore, the answers will at last give an information on the popularity of such theories.
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A comparison of the reported multipliers with the values that are implicit in the forecasts would therefore be very interesting, but is beyond the scope and data of this paper. It is noteworthy, though, that the survey asked the forecasters to leave the form blank, if they are not able to give an assessment, which 41 persons actually did (as compared to 40, which gave an estimate). Furthermore, one person took the opportunity of the general comment at the end of the survey to argue that the information given in the scenario is not sufficient to quantify the impact of fiscal policy on growth.
The second "thought experiment", for which respondents are asked to make a quantitative guess is an acceleration of money growth in the Euro area (the ECB increases money supply permanently 1 percentage point faster than previously done) starting from a vaguely defined "equilibrium" situation in the absence of negative supply shocks.
12 Figure 5b shows the distribution of the estimates in the short-as well as in the long-run. While virtually no forecaster gives money supply a big role for inflation in the short-run, there is considerable disagreement regarding the long-run effects: some forecasters see a zero or a minor impact of money growth on inflation. Roughly half of the respondents however, assumes even a one-to-one relation between the two numbers (which might even correspond better to the old-school pre-Friedman quantity theory of money, as to the version with a non-stable, but predictable money demand). As a third "thought experiment" -see Figure 5c -we asked forecasters about the employment effects of a 10 % increase of the minimum wage. 13 Interestingly, the bulk of answers point to no effects in the short as well as in the long run. However, disagreement is high: Some even assume a long-run elasticity of 0.75.
To check whether the quantitative assessments are in line with the reported underlying theoretical position of the forecasters, we grouped the forecasters into two subgroups: those who lean towards more neoclassical positions and those, who have described themselves rather as a Keynesian and compare the quantitative assessments between these two groups (see Table 6 ). We confirm significant differences regarding the effects of money-supply shifts between the "neo-classical" and the "Keynesian" camps. We can furthermore see significant differences in the assessment of minimum wage increases between forecasters working in private and those working in public institutions. It is interesting to see that on average forecasters working in public institutions are more concerned about negative consequences of minimum wage increases than those working in private institutions. To what extent ideological positions of the respective institutions play a role is a question for further research. There are no significant differences between the camps regarding the "fiscal multiplier thought experiment". 
Consensus, the loss function, and the risk of herding
In this part of the survey, we tried to collect direct evidence on some topics that have recently been discussed in the academic literature about macroeconomic forecasting. To start with, we have taken a look on the self-perceived orientation 
Short-run impact of money supply
Long-run impact of money supply
Short-run impact of minimum wage
Long-run impact of minimum wage
By theoretical position Leaning Neoclassical
Leaning Keynesian
Notes: a t-value for a parametric test for equal means. b Rank sum for a non-parametric test for equal medians. p-values in brackets.
Source: own survey and calculation. NA: calculation impossible due to lack of data. of the forecasters towards the consensus forecast. The theoretical literature (Lamont 2002) suggest that forecasters may face a trade-off: on one hand, sticking to the consensus reduces the risk of a (relative) reputation loss in case of a wrong prediction. On the other hand, departing from the consensus leads to additional attention from the public, which might be valuable for forecasters. Furthermore, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) discuss another form of strategic forecasters behaviour and argue that forecasters may aim at convincing their customers that they are well-informed. Given this goal and the assumption that the customers expect forecasters to be honest, it appears to be rational for a forecaster to stick close to the prior mean of all forecasts.
The results depicted in Figure 6 , suggests that most of the forecasters seem to be riskaverse in this respect, i. e. being close to the consensus is much more popular than departing from the other forecasters. This is in line with the findings in the literature (see Dovern et al. 2012 Dovern et al. , 2014 , and the literature cited therein). 
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Another interesting part of the behaviour of the forecasters is, how quick they react to new information. Again, this might relate to the risk appetite of the individuals forecasters. Since new information might turn out to be wrong, risk averse forecasters might prefer to stick to the old forecast as long as a very strong case for a change cannot be made. Turning to our results, such an attitude is quite popular among the respondents, whereas the idea to react quickly is less frequently chosen. This again is in line with findings in the literature (see Nordhaus 1987; Coibion/Gorodnichenko 2012, and the literature cited therein).
We have also tested whether the attitude towards the forecasting process depends on the nature of the forecasting institution (private vs. public). As the results in Table 7 show, the answers regarding the loss function and the speed of forecast revision seem to be quite similar, whereas the consensus forecast has different meanings for public and private forecasters: it is more important for public forecasters to stay on the neighbourhood of the consensus forecast. Assuming that private forecasters might have more incentives to search attention of the media etc., this finding would be in line with the reasoning of Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) . Additionally, one may suspect that the theoretical position of a forecaster influences his/her loss function or other behaviour.
As Table 7 reveals, we do not find any support for this notion.
Another important topic refers to the loss function of forecasters. Several papers (see Döpke et al., 2010 , and the literature cited therein) have tested whether the loss function of the forecasters may be asymmetric. Thus, we have asked the forecasters directly, whether they value over-and underestimation differently. The vast majority of the forecasters is committed to a symmetric loss function, only a very few of them see the loss function of their institution as asymmetric. Among these answers, seeing over-estimation as more harmful is slightly more popular than the reverse case.
The organization of the forecasting group and motivation of the forecasters
It is quite possible, that forecast accuracy is not just limited by factors surrounding the institution, but also by the organization of the unit and motivation of its members. Hence, in a first step, we elaborated on the discussion process within the forecasting unit (see Figure 7) . Interestingly, a very large majority of the forecasters sees the final forecast as a consensus within the group. Decisions by the majority of the group or hierarchical decision processes are mentioned less frequently.
To some extent, the answers seem to contradict each other (e. g., both, the statement according to which the forecast is a consensus among the group, and the statement, according to which the leader of the group makes the final decision find substantial support).
The results in Figure 8 suggest that forecasters are to a surprisingly degree intrinsically motivated. While statements like "I enjoy forecasting" find widespread support, suggested answers that would imply an extrinsic motivation are chosen only rarely. Part of a reason for this could be that usually, forecasting in practise is not a standalone profession, but often part of the tasks that an employee in an economic research institute holds. Often, forecasters have many responsibilities, of which forecasting is only one. Additionally, there is arguably one interesting exception from this general picture about a forecaster's Theories, Techniques motivation: forecasters often state that they want to be part of recent economic and political developments and/or like to have influence on economic policy. This might simply refer to the human wish to have a meaningful life. However, it could also indicate that some forecasters have an own political agenda and/or hope for jobs in governments or central banks. These motivations might be seen as more extrinsic as compared to the sheer fun that forecasting might give to the forecasters.
Of course, working as a forecaster also has its disadvantages. We asked for some specific factors that might have demotivated the individuals that work in this area and report the results in Figure 9 . The two most frequently chosen answers, however, might not be seen as specific to working in a forecasting unit: working with the colleagues and the bosses is most likely problematic in virtually all jobs from time to time. Factors that are more specific to the forecasting business are chosen less frequently.
Nevertheless, some free answers to this question, listed in appendix section 4, point to a problematic role of the forecasters in the public. For example, one forecaster claims that forecasts are, in fact, "irrelevant". Another person The final forecast emerges as a consensus within the forecasting group
The forecast is determined by the majority of the forecasting group
The final forecast is determined by the leader of the forecasting group
In case of opinions diverging from the majority or the leader of the forecasting unit, it is possible to include the diverging positions into the text describing the forecast (e.g. as a risk scenario)
In discussing our forecast, we also use structured methods of opinion formation (e.g. the Delphi method)
Within the discussion of the forecast I try to convince the others of my opinion
The forecast has to be coordinated with other parts of our institution that are not directly involved in the forecasting process
The forecast serves as an input for other parts of our institution
The implications of the forecast have to be in line with the economic policy recommendations of our institution, even if this leads to a fading of the forecasting group's opinion into the background
In forming the forecast, rhetorical and argumentative skills of the group members are relevant M e a n (S
D )
A complains that there is little understanding for the forecasting work, even by other economists. It goes almost without saying that several forecasts name forecast errors and the related pressure and reputation loss as demotivating.
Forecast quality by forecaster's attributes
Hypotheses, which are arguably popular in the public opinion, state that forecast accuracy depends on certain attributes of forecasters. Forecasters in public and private institutions might face different incentives and, therefore, might be more or less successful in predicting future economic developments. Forecasters that rely on a specific theoretical model might also be systematically better or worse than those who believe in another model. Relying on the information of our survey, we are able to link a sub-sample of the forecasters to the forecast accuracy of their institution. To this end, we use the "longterm" evaluation conducted by Fricke (2016) , who ranks several institution by forecast accuracy. Figure 10 depicts the (long-run) rank of a forecasting I had no alternative I had to make forecasts to achieve other professional goals . A higher rank corresponds to better forecast accuracy. While it seems not reasonable to undertake any statistical inference (we have only 4 institutions that qualify as leaning Neoclassical) eyeballing the data suggest no important differences between the two theoretical camps, although the Keynesian-leaning forecasters perform slightly better if one refers to the mean rank. By and large, the same holds for a break-down by the nature of the institution: no noteworthy differences are detectable. There is, however, a much smaller variance across the public institutions in the ranks. 14 Still, we conclude that our results are in line with previous findings of, e. g., Batchelor and Dua (1990a) , who conclude that "all forecasters are (statistically) equal."
The calculation of the models
The media attention and the public eye 14 At this point it is necessary to recall an important caveat of our analysis: we held the individual forecaster accountable for the accuracy of his/ her institution. It might well be the case that the forecasters would have known better, but was in a minority position within his/ her institution. 
Conclusions
We have conducted a survey among active forecasters of the German business cycle. 82 forecasters stemming from 37 different institutions have responded. The results suggest that practitioners in the forecasting branch subscribe to wellestablished methods and theories. We find no close link to the recent debates in the more academic sphere. This might relate to the distinction between economists as "scientists" and "engineers" as argued by Mankiw (2006) and Colander (2017) . As Mankiw (2006: 29) puts it: "Engineers are, first and foremost, problemsolvers. By contrast, the goal of scientists is to understand how the world works.". Consequently, both types of macroeconomics have different aims and require alternative tools. While scientists in this sense are naturally interested in models -and, perhaps in micro-founded ones, engineers might well be more interested in heuristics, which he (Colander 2017 : 2) sees as "anything that provides a plausible aid or direction in the solution of a problem", but is eventually fallible. Recent approaches from the academic literature (like, e. g., DSGE models) are more popular among forecaster from public institutions than among their colleagues from private institutions. In this context, the differences between "scientists" and "engineers" is not necessarily a problem: as both popular commentators of economic policy (Smith 2017) and eminent academics (Blanchard 2017 ) have pointed out, there are divergent aims of macroeconomics require different types of models.
Regarding two aspects, we can confirm findings from the earlier literature: First, forecasters seem to be risk-averse and tend to lean towards the consensus and second, there is a self-reported behaviour to revise forecasts only gradually. This is in line with the findings in the literature.
Individual statements given in the open answer categories indicate, that "experience" and "historical experience" were given as important elements of the forecasting process. It implies that the topic "how experience shapes expectations" is somewhat present but the effect might be different to quantify.
Confirming results from previous studies (Batchelor/Dua 1990b) we also cannot establish a stable relationship between preferred theories and methods and forecast accuracy. The differences with respect to the theories forecasters subscribe to, however, point to cohort effects similar to effects observed among the general public (Malmendier/Nagel 2016) .
Furthermore, from the open answer categories we can also infer, that large forecast errors seem to have an impact on the self-perception and self-reflection of forecasters. Several forecasters report the high importance of uncertainty (in the Knightian sense) and report efforts to evaluate forecasts more regularly and try to minimize the dependency from one method. 
Other methods
The following additional or alternative models have been mentioned (each item corresponds to one respondent) in response to the question: "You have chosen "Other methods" in the previous question. Please indicate briefly the method(-s) you have in mind and how often they are used." -"Zyklusvergleich" (Comparison of cycles) and "Nicht-parametrische
Methoden" (Non-parametric methods) -"Faustregeln" (Rules of thumb) and "Historische Elastizitäten" (Historical elasticities) -"Judgemental adjustments, Horizontal brainstorming" -"Eigene Umfragen" (Own surveys) -"Zyklenvergleiche" (Comparison of cycles) -"Eigene Unternehmensbefragung" (own business survey) (Note: we have skipped additional information to keep the anonymity.) -"Kurzfristprognose-Modelle (Faktormodelle, Brückengleichungen). Häufig und regelmäßig (alle 2 Wochen)." (Short-term forecasting models, factor models, bridge-equations, often and on a regular basis (every 2 weeks)).
Other theories
The following statements have been made in response to the question: "You have chosen "other theories" in the previous question. Please indicate briefly, which theories you have in mind and how important they are." -"Debitismus"
Reasons for forecast errors Ferner wird dann auf fehlende Kompetenz geschlossen. Das trifft nicht nur auf die Offentlichkeit,¨sondern auch auf andere Volkswirte anderer Bereiche zu." (The wrong perception of the forecasts. The public opinion and the colleagues do not sufficiently recognize how uncertain (shocks etc.) the realisation of forecasts is. Moreover, from this it is concluded that forecasters are not competent. This does not only hold for the general public, but also for economist from other areas).
-"Nichts" (Nothing). 
Other remarks
At the end of the questionnaire, we asked in a free question for general comments, which may have occurred during answering the survey -"Die Fragen zu Fiskalmultiplikator, Mindestlohn etc empfinde ich als sehr problematisch, da das Situationsbedingte/der Kontext noch viel mehr abgefragt werden müsste" (I see the question regarding the fiscal multiplier, minimum wage etc. as very problematic, since the situational context should have been queried much more precisely) -"Beim langfristigen Fiskalmultiplikator hätte ich gerne die Möglichkeit gehabt, einen negativen Wert einzugeben." (As regards the long-run multiplier I would like to had the opportunity to enter a negative value) -"Mir wären oftmals eindeutige Antwortmöglichkeiten wie ja/nein lieber als diese graduellen Abstufungen." (I would have preferred clear-cut yes/noanswer opportunities instead of the graduations.) -"Makroökonomische Konjunkturprognosen sind weit mehr als nur eine möglichst treffsichere Punktprognose für BIP-Wachstum oder Inflation. Jenseits der kurzen Frist (1-2 Quartale) ist die Prognosegüte nicht anhand des Prognosefehlers festzumachen (einfache Vergleichsmodelle wie ARPrognosen sind dort nämlich kaum zu schlagen), sondern anhand der Konsistenz und Stimmigkeit des Prognosegesamtbildes und seiner verschiedenen Komponenten ("Story" hinter dem Prognose-Basisszeario -dieses stellt die aus Sicht des Prognostikers wahrscheinlichste Entwicklung bedingt auf die exogenen Annahmen und auf die Annahme des Abklingens vergangener ökonomischer Schocks und des Ausbleibens zukünftiger Schocks dar" (Macroeconomic business cycle forecasts are much more than just as precise as possible a point forecast of GDP growth or inflation. Beyond the very short-run time horizon(1-2 quarters) forecast accuracy cannot be measured with a simple forecast error (since simple competing models like AR models are much better in this regard). Rather, forecasts have to be judged by the consistency and coherence of the underlying picture and its different components (the "story" of the base-scenario of the forecast, which gives the most likely development in the eyes of the forecaster given the assumptions for exogenous factors and the unwinding of past economic shocks and the non-existence of future shocks))
